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TAXATION OF UNINCORPORATED MEDICAL GROUPS
The recent decision of the United States District Court of the
Northern District of Texas in Galt v. United States, holding that a
group of doctors practicing as the Southwest Clinic Association, though
unable to incorporate under the laws of Texas, was to be treated as
an "association" under § 7701(a) (3) of the IRC of 1954, adds another
case to the growing weight of authority granting the benefits of
corporate status to groups of doctors associated together in practice.
While the language of the case is of no great significance, the result
reached by the court may be of important consequence to similar
groups of doctors. A survey of the background of the Galt case and
its impact on the attitude of the Internal Revenue Service may be of
interest.
HISTORY'
Section 7701(a) (3) provides that the term "corporation" includes
"associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies."' The
problem of determining just what an association is as contrasted to
a partnership has been the subject of many decisions under several
Revenue Acts. In 1935 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit declared that ". . the decisions are seemingly in a hopeless
state of confusion."" In the same year the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissionce undertook to clarify the situation by establishing
definite rules characterizing an association. In Morrissey the Court
considered as pertinent to the classification the following tests:
1. title to the property held by the entity,
2. centralized management,
3. continuity uninterrupted by death among the beneficial owners,
4. transfer of interests without affecting the continuity of the
enterprise, and
5. limitation of personal liability of the participants.
It was indicated in Morrissey as well as in several cases follow-
ing it that absence of one or more of the characteristics does not
preclude the organization from being an association. 5 Thus, in Bert
1 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
2
 1954 IRC 7701(a)(3).
8 Coleman-Gilbert Associates v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 191, 193 (1st Cir. 1935);
rev'd on other grounds 296 U.S. 369 (1935).
4 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
5 Ibid. at 357: "The inclusion of associations with corporations in the Internal
Revenue Code implies resemblance, but it is resemblance and not identity." Cf.:
Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935) ; Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner,
149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945); Helm & Smith Syndicate v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 440
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v. Helverine it was stated ". . . the real test is whether the enterprise
more nearly resembles in general form and mode of procedure a cor-
poration than a partnership." The court also pointed out that simi-
larities and dissimilarities must be compared and contrasted and
resemblances balanced to determine whether the entity is predomi-
nantly akin to a corporation or a partnership in method and form of
conducting business.?
The authorities and regulations have made it clear that for the
purpose of federal taxation Congress is not bound by the legal classi-
fication of business organizations as determined by state laws. ° The
status of a particular entity as a partnership or as a corporation
under state law is not, therefore, controlling in determining whether
it is subject to federal taxation. An unincorporated association, though
a partnership by state law, may nevertheless be included within the
term "corporation" as defined in the Revenue Act.' "Substance rather
than form controls . . . , and the realities of the taxpayer's economic
interest rather than the niceties of the conveyancer's art should deter-
mine the power to tax."'°
This is not to say, however, that state law never enters this area.
It is important to keep in mind that the presence or absence of any of
the requisite characteristics set out in Morrissey could depend on rights
or liabilities created under local law. The fact that the agreement or
charter might contain language under which any of these Morrissey
characteristics would appear to be present or absent would be im-
material if local law actually gives a contrary result. Thus, in
Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner" the court examined the organi-
zation and legal powers and liabilities of the members of the limited
partnership under the New York statute and concluded that it was not
an association for federal tax purposes since although there was
centralized management by the general partners, they were acting in
(9th Cir. 1943) ; Pa. Co. for Insurance on Lives & Granting Annuities v. United States,
138 F.2d 869 (3rd Cir. 1943).
0 92 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1937). See, Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F.2d 154
(10th Cir. 1934).
T Ibid. See also, Del Mar Addition v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1940).
8 1954 IRC Begs. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1953); Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v.
Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) ; Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 5;
Sherman v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Pa. Co. for Insurance on
Lives & Granting Annuities v. United States, supra note 5; Commissioner v. Fortney
Oil Co. County Farm Lease, 125 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Brouillard,
supra note 6.
9 Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, supra note 8; Haley v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953).
10 Haley v. Commissioner, supra note 9 at 818.
11 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942); Western Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 453
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 191 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1951).
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their own interest and not merely in a representative capacity; the
limited partners were not able to remove the general partners and
control them as agents; the limited partners could be increased in
number, but new limited partners acquired no share in control; con-
tinuity of existence was contingent on agreement of the remaining
general partners; on the death of a general partner his interest had
to be paid over to his personal representative, and to that extent the
capital would be liquidated; and finally, the assets were held in tenancy
in partnership and not by the partnership as an entity. Here, plainly,
the organization as it actually existed under the laws of New York
resembled a partnership more closely than a corporation.
Thus, it is the local law which must be applied in determining
such matters as the legal relations of the members of the organization
among themselves and with the public at large and the interests of the
members of the organization in its assets. The end result of this
application is then held up to the federal regulations and criteria
established thereunder to see if the organization is similar to a cor-
poration.
TEMPORARY FLUCTUATION
In Pelton v. Commissioner 12
 in answer to the Commissioner's
contention that a group of doctors was an association and taxable as a
corporation, the petitioner argued that under the laws of Illinois a
corporation could not practice medicine. It was held nevertheless that
as long as the organization was in substantial conformity with the
established criteria of Morrissey, its formal status under state law
was of no significance. Yet, in 1954, in the well-known case of United
States v. Kintneri 3
 the Commissioner reversed his position taken in
Pelton and contended that since Montana did not allow a corporation
to practice medicine, the medical group was to be taxed as a partner-
ship, seemingly proposing a new and additional test for the taxability
of groups as associations, namely, that state law controls as to the
purpose for which an association may be formed. The Commissioner's
change of position on this point was commented on by the court while
deciding "that (1) the association had more of the criteria of a cor-
poration and (2) that this being so, the status of the association under
state law should be disregarded under the Bureau's own regulations." 14
Following the decision in Kintner the Commissioner ruled that he
would continue to treat such groups of doctors as partnerships for all
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.' 5 Later, he promised to issue
12 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
18 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
14 Ibid at 422.
n Int. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598.
262
STUDENT COMMENTS
a ruling listing basic criteria to be used in testing whether a particular
organization of doctors or other professional groups should be treated
as an association or a partnership."
PRESENT STATUS
In the 1959 decision in Galt v. United States, previously men-
tioned in the introduction, the District Court of Texas held that since
there was ownership by the association of property used in the
operation of the clinic, centralization of management through an
executive committee and the board of directors chosen by members
of the association, continuity of organization without interruption
of the business by reason of the death or retirement of a member,
transferability of membership, and limitation of liability, the South-
west Clinic Association was entitled to be treated for federal income
tax purposes as though it were a corporation. The Galt case involved
a suit by a taxpayer and his wife to recover federal income taxes paid
under protest. Plaintiff was a member of a partnership of doctors
which in 1954 formed an association to which the partners transferred
all partnership assets. The doctors who had been partners retained
no interest in these assets. The association was set up with a life of
thirty-five years. The laws of Texas do not include the practice of
medicine as one of the purposes for which a corporation can be
formed, but the doctors drew up articles of association containing in
substance all the characteristics of a corporation. Interests were held
by seven doctors from whom was elected a six-man board of directors.
The doctors as well as the employees of the predecessor partnership
became employees of the Association. The doctors were controlled
by the Association to the extent that each was limited to practice in
his own department, hours of work were set by the board of directors
and no doctor could refuse a patient assigned to him. No separate
record was kept of individual billings of the doctors, and in lieu of
fees from patients they received as the sole income from their services
a salary and bonus from the Association. The articles of association
provided that when a doctor retired he would not receive any of the
assets of the Association, they being distributable only on termination
of the Association. A schedule of priority of payments was established.
While the bylaws provided that ownership of an interest in the Asso-
ciation could be transferred, the Association and the other associates
had first option of purchase at the offering price. The associates were
not liable for indebtedness either of the Association or of any other
15 Mt. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
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associates until the assets of the Association and of the defaulting
associate had been used in full to reduce the indebtedness.
The taxpayer and his wife filed a joint income tax return. A tax
return was filed for the Association. Both paid taxes. The Revenue
Service determined that the Association should be treated as a partner-
ship with the result that the taxes on the money set aside by the As-
sociation as a reserve fund should be allocated and paid by the respec-
tive members. The portion thus assessed against the taxpayer was
paid under protest, and he brought suit to recover the same, taking the
position that the tax liability was discharged by payment in the name
of the Association.
In answer to the Commissioner's contention that the absence of
the practice of medicine as one of the purposes for which a corporation
could be formed in Texas prevented the Association from qualifying
as an association taxable as a corporation, Davidson, C. J. emphasized
that ". . . the act of a state can neither raise nor lower the federal
taxes that may be due by the association by whatever name it may
be called under the laws of the particular state." 17
This decision seems to have hastened the issuance of the long-
awaited detailed ruling promised earlier by the Commissioner. Pro-
posed regulations to Chapter 79 of the IRC of 1954 were published
on December 23, 1959, and § 301.7701-2(g) outlines the position of
the Internal Revenue Service on associations of doctors. Basically,
there has been no change in the law itself since the proposed regula-
tions adopt the holdings of Morrissey as to the criteria required and
Bert v. Helvering as to the degree of similarity necessary. The regu-
lations also reflect the decisions in the Kintner and Galt cases, and it
now seems settled that the mere formalistic inability of a corporation
to practice medicine under state law will not be a barrier to the classi-
fication of a group as an association.
Once classified as an association, that designation applies for
all purposes of the IRC, 18 and the group is eligible to establish pension
or profit-sharing plans.' 9 If the plan qualifies as one set up for the
exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries, the income paid
into it by the association will be tax-free and the income payable to
the participants of the plan will be tax-deferred." In Kintner it was
held not only that the association could establish such a plan but also
17 Supra note 1 at 362.
18 Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, and Sherman v. Commissioner, supra
note 8.
19 1954 IRC § 401-404.
29 Tavannes Watch Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211 (2nd Cir. 1949).
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that the doctor-associates as employees of the association were eligible
to participate. Section 404.1004(c) (2) of Regulations, in defining
"employee," states that an employee is subject to the will and control
of the employer not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be
done, and in this connection it is not necessary that the employer
actually direct or control the manner in which the services are per-
formed as long as he has the right to do so. 2 ' The right to discharge
is an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right
is an employer. 22
 As pointed out by the lower court in Kintner, by
the very nature of the medical profession, there can be no over-the-
shoulder supervision of the doctor's methods and techniques, but
where the association set his office hours and vacation periods and the
doctor received none of his fees as such and could be discharged from
membership in the association without interrupting the continuity of
life of the association, the doctor was an employee of the association.
Thus, the recent action of the Commissioner indicates a willing-
ness to allow the members of medical associations equal status with
corporate officers who have long been held to be employees of a
corporation.23
OUTLOOK
At the present time, local law as it affects the substance of the
organization is an insurmountable obstacle in some states, and for
this reason, a thorough check of the state law must be made as the
first step toward establishing a similar clinic or association.
It is not inconceivable that a situation could develop in this area
similar to that which brought about Congressional action in the
income-splitting provisions which were designed to afford to spouses in
non-community property states the tax advantages of an equal division
of income between them, such formerly being available as an auto-
matic privilege only under the community property system?'
Similarly, since it would appear that the states' interest in these
associations is centered mainly on the personal versus the corporate
liability factor, it may well be that agitation on the part of medical
groups who desire to gain some of the valuable tax advantages accru-
21 20 C.F.R. § 404.1004(c) (2).
22 Jones v. Goodson, 121 F,2d 176 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Hemmerle v. Hobby, 114
F. Supp. 16 (D. N.J. 1953) ; Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
23 20 C.F.R. § 404.1004 (b).
24 1954 IRC § 6013; Marshall v. Hofferbert, 108 F. Supp. 350 (D. Md. 1952), aff'd
200 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1952). In connection with possible Congressional action in this
area, see H.R. 64, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) on Smathers, Morton, Keogh, Simpson
Bill, which would allow self-employed individuals to set up individual retirement
programs.
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ing to classification as an association, such as tax-exempt pension
plans and profit-sharing plans, will result in state action to insure that
all the other standards can be met under local law. 25
ANNE P. JONES
25 Just as many states legislated to permit donees of powers of appointment to
freely release the powers and avoid the impact of the federal estate tax.
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